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Hopes, Fears, and Dreams: 
A Comparison of the International 
Positions of the Shanghai and 
Taiwan Stock Exchanges
Erik Larson
The Shanghai Stock Exchange occupies a new building in Luji-
azui Special Financial District in Pudong—the “new city” that in a 
decade erased any remnants of the former agricultural district across 
the Huangpu River from “old” Shanghai. The large stock exchange 
trading floor, though, may be quieter than the old agricultural fields, 
as most brokers work in offices away from the exchange, leaving a 
skeleton staff of reserve brokers to deal with rare contingencies. A 
glass-enclosed viewing area overlooks the trading floor. Behind the 
viewing area, the stock exchange shows off gifts given by companies 
on their listing and photographs of prominent visitors. Aside from the 
litany of Chinese government officials, Tony Blair, Kofi Annan, and 
Fidel Castro are among the featured international dignitaries in the 
pictures, attesting that the Shanghai Stock Exchange serves, at the very 
least, as a scheduled stop for such luminaries and as a visible symbol 
of the new international face of Shanghai.
Approximately 400 miles south, the Taiwan Stock Exchange does 
not display its international presence on the walls, despite its presti-
gious address. The stock exchange occupies three lower floors in Taipei 
101, which (at least for now) is the tallest building in the world. Despite 
being less visible in its physical location, the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
has attracted international attention. With the exchange standing on 
the cusp of reclassification as a developed market, it has put forth its 
own international face.
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The history of cross-Strait relations and the political economy of the 
region raise a question: Are these two neighboring stock exchanges 
worlds apart or a part of a similar world? Based on recent history, 
with the mainland’s experience of the iterations of Chinese Commu-
nism and Taiwan’s pro-capitalist orientation, one might anticipate that 
the exchanges are quite distinct. Yet, given the recent market-oriented 
reforms in China, the history of Chinese migration to and assimilation 
of Taiwan, and current regional dynamics, one might also predict that 
both exchanges are part of a “greater China.” Indeed, a U.S.-based 
mutual fund that invests in the region noted in a recent report to share-
holders: “Longer term, we expect to view our exposure to these three 
stock markets [Taiwan, Shanghai, and Hong Kong] not so much as 
separate countries but as forming our ‘Greater China’ exposure.”1
To approach this question, I focus on one particular aspect of the 
exchanges’ operation: the ways in which the Shanghai and Taiwan 
Stock Exchanges position themselves internationally. While such a 
focus does not capture the full range of exchange activity, both of 
these exchanges have undertaken significant efforts in recent years to 
internationalize their markets. Furthermore, the logic of international-
ization and the exchanges’ views of global finance provide insight into 
how these markets operate. To understand the logic of international-
ization undertaken by both exchanges, I interviewed stock exchange 
officials and market participants in both Taipei and Shanghai, with 
particular attention to the ways in which the exchanges engage global 
financial markets, international investors, and other exchanges in the 
region. In doing so, I follow recent sociological research about finan-
cial markets that seeks to understand markets in their social contexts.2 
Starting from these social contexts, one can understand the combina-
tion of logics—social, political, and economic—that serve to shape the 
structure and operation of markets.
The relations between the Shanghai and Taiwan Stock Exchanges 
and the governments of China and Taiwan shape the international 
orientations of the exchanges. The particular concerns of the state work 
to define the types of concerns that underlie the exchanges’ orienta-
tions. To present the argument, I offer a brief overview of the two 
stock exchanges before comparing the exchanges’ international orien-
tations. In both cases, the exchanges blend the hopeful expectation that 
international investors can help to control problems associated with 
domestic investors with a fearful worry that these same international 
investors may harm the national economy. Despite this mixed assess-
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ment of international investors, both exchanges see these investors as 
important in securing their place in the regional and world economies. 
Finally, I conclude by reconsidering what to make of the differences 
found by the comparative analysis. Considering the Chinese and Tai-
wanese political economies, I postulate that these two countries may 
not be worlds apart.
I. Background on the Shanghai and Taiwan Stock Exchanges
While Shanghai had historically been a financial center for China, with 
company shares issued and trading during the nineteenth century, 
securities trading ceased with the Communist victory in 1949. Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms from the 1980s, however, encouraged the redevel-
opment of capital markets. As part of these reforms, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) opened in late 1990, trading shares of eight par-
tially privatized companies. By the end of 2005, over 800 companies 
had shares listed on the SSE, which also listed a variety of other finan-
cial instruments, including bonds, warrants, and convertibles. Notably, 
there are two different classes of shares that trade on the SSE: 834 com-
panies have listed A shares (which are for trading by domestic inves-
tors) and 54 companies have listed B shares (which are for trading by 
all investors, although until 2001 they were open only to foreign inves-
tors).3 At the end of 2005, total market value was approximately 290 
billion U.S. dollars, or about 13% of China’s gross domestic product.4
The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) has a longer continuous his-
tory than the SSE. Many capitalists in China fled to Taiwan with the 
Kuomintang or to Hong Kong after the Communist take-over. In the 
late 1950s, the government in Taiwan began to research establishing a 
stock exchange, with its formal launch in 1962. By year-end 2005, the 
TSE had 691 listed companies, with a total market value of approxi-
mately 490 billion U.S. dollars, or about 140% of gross domestic 
product.5
Despite its nearly 45-year history as an operating exchange, the TSE’s 
exposure to foreign investors is considerably shorter. When launched 
in 1962, the TSE was open only to domestic investors. The first opening 
to foreign investors for the Taiwan market came in 1983, with indi-
rect investment: a domestic fund management company raised capital 
from abroad for investment in Taiwan and the investment fund was 
listed for trading in New York and London. In 1991, the government 
of Taiwan permitted Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)—
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those financial institutions with sufficient capitalization, experience, 
and commitment—to invest directly in the Taiwanese market, but only 
up to a certain quota. Since that time, the requirements and restrictions 
on investments have been relaxed, so that in 1996 foreign individuals 
were allowed to invest; in 2000, foreign ownership caps were lifted for 
all but a small number of strategic companies; and in 2003, the QFII 
system was abolished, allowing foreign institutions and individuals 
simply to register prior to investing in Taiwan.
In China, the B share market initially segregated foreign investors 
from domestic ones. In 2003, the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission announced regulations to decrease the separation between 
domestic and foreign investors. In addition to opening the B share 
market to all investors, China established QFII regulations, following 
Taiwan’s model. Since this initial opening, the cap on aggregate foreign 
institutional investment has been increased from U.S. $4 billion dollars 
to U.S. $10 billion.
II. Hope: Instrumental Orientation toward International Investors
While the Shanghai Stock Exchange remains less developed by stan-
dard market metrics than the Taiwan Stock Exchange, both exchanges 
share a remarkable feature: the relative dominance of individual inves-
tors and the absence of domestic institutional investors. In Taiwan, 
domestic individual investors hold approximately 50% of the shares 
listed on the TSE and engage in a disproportionate share of trading. In 
2005, domestic individuals accounted for over two-thirds of the value 
of shares traded.6 In Shanghai individuals play a similarly large role. 
Initially, the Class A shares were considered “individual” shares, with 
market participants distinguishing between dahu (big players, or indi-
viduals who earned their wealth without assistance from the state or 
their family) and sanhu (dispersed individuals or small investors).7 The 
number of individual investor accounts has increased from 1.3 million 
in 1992 to over 37 million by year-end 2005.8 While domestic mutual 
funds have grown substantially since the early days of the SSE and are 
the “dominant institutional player in China’s stock market,”9 they still 
account for less than 30% of the total market value.
Both exchanges view this large proportion of individual par-
ticipation as problematic. As institutions with a public purpose, the 
exchanges’ missions include educating and protecting the public, par-
ticularly individual investors. To the extent that these people comprise 
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the bulk of investors, the importance of this mission is magnified. A 
market official in Taiwan explained:
Individual investors are almost 75% of our investors. Lots of individual 
investors are retired people or housewives. They do not know much 
about the companies’ situations, so we have to make a lot of effort to 
help them get the information.
These efforts are not limited to basic information about the companies. 
They also concern market trading information, particularly given the 
short-term orientation of many of the individuals. The Taiwan Stock 
Exchange will denote certain shares as “attention stocks,” as explained 
by a market official:
[We will publish a stock as an attention stock] if a security has been trad-
ing during a certain period of time and we notice that the price move-
ment, volume, or concentration rate is unusual. Then we will make that 
public: This security has been trading at unusually high volume. Maybe 
you should take notice. We let the retail investor know, ‘There might be a 
risk if you trade this security.’
Public information dissemination is part of the operation of any stock 
exchange, but the types of activities to notify the public in Taiwan go 
beyond the basic level of information. More importantly, the market 
officials see these activities as “quite special” for Taiwan, a consequence 
of the high concentration of individual investors. The importance of 
protecting individual investors was highlighted by another market 
official:
I think that government would…prefer that [individuals] have a long-
term investment, because many years ago in Taiwan, a lot of housewives 
when they went to [go to] the food market, they went to the stock bro-
kerage firms instead of going to the food market and they stayed there 
for the whole morning. When the market became very volatile, most of 
them lost their money and some people committed suicide. It became a 
social problem.
The predominant position of individual investors also served as the 
explanation for a TSE rule that limits share price movement in any par-
ticular security to a seven percent change per day.
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[I]f we don’t have the price limit, then it means that the market will 
perhaps be more volatile and that’s not something the individuals can 
accept. If our market structure has more institutional investors partici-
pating in the market, then those professional entities would just judge 
by themselves.
The rationale, however, does not ring true with the characterization 
of individual investors as short-term speculators, who would be able 
to realize greater investment gains if the price limits did not exist. It 
may be equally likely that the limitations on price movement exist as 
attempts to limit the attraction of speculation.
Market officials understand attracting international investment, 
in part, from this perspective of protecting individual investors. In 
response to the question of why it is important to attract foreign inves-
tors, a market official explained that foreign investors may act to curb 
market volatility:
I think the structure of the investment in Taiwan is that 70% is individu-
als and 30% is institutions, essentially foreign institutional investors. 
We would like to change the structure. [Attracting foreign investors] is 
the way to increase our institutional investors’ percentage. Institutional 
investors have positive effects in the market. They hold the shares lon-
ger, [they are] more reasonable.
The positive effects extend beyond the trading effects of the foreign 
investors by creating change in the way that domestic individuals 
invest.
One way that government hopes that we can change the structure of the 
stock market is for those individuals to trust their money to a consult-
ing company to manage and invest on behalf of them. That’s why we 
encourage the foreign investors to participate in our market. Then they 
can change the structure of the stock market.
International investors in this sense are seen in instrumental terms. By 
creating a larger institutional base of shareholding, foreign investors 
can introduce “more reasonable” approaches to investing. Their abil-
ity to “judge” market developments “by themselves” presumably will 
lead to a long-term success that can convince individuals to trust their 
investments to intermediaries.
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The Shanghai Stock Exchange shares a remarkably similar under-
standing of the problems of the predominance of individual inves-
tors as well as the perception of international investors as a means to 
help solve these problems. A market participant explained that the SSE 
plays an important regulatory role:
The exchange is the state. They are there to regulate what even the regu-
lator says is the national casino… . The stock exchange is intended to 
regulate what is perceived to be anti-social economic activity, where I’m 
trying to make money off of your lack of information.
The vulnerability of individuals to the effects of the market figures 
prominently in decision-making about exchange policy. In her ethnog-
raphy of the SSE, anthropologist Ellen Hertz noted that among indi-
viduals not involved in government, the concern was that individuals 
might commit suicide after losing money in the market.10
The close connection between the exchange and the state provides 
a means through which the market can be regulated. A market partici-
pant recalled:
There were periods in the ’90s when there were two dollars of funds 
in trading accounts waiting to buy shares for every dollar of market 
cap[italization], so the market could not go down. Then [former Prime 
Minister] Zhu Rongji made some changes to that and drove the market 
down instantly because he just took away all the money out of the trad-
ing accounts.
More direct evidence of the state’s involvement in regulating the mar-
ket is offered by Hertz, who provided details about how the People’s 
Bank intervened in the market on a regular basis. One official of the 
People’s Bank interviewed by Hertz explained that:
[T]he stock market was now in a ‘period of adjustment’ (tiozhen jieduan). 
‘Investors’ psychological ability to stand losses was very poor’ (gumin de 
xinli chengshou nengli tai cha). It was their office’s job to ‘diminish as much 
as possible the shock to society’ (jinliang jianshao dui shehui de zhengdang) 
and ‘avoid social unrest’ (bimian shehui gaoluan) by exercising control 
over the market.11
While the domestic attempts to limit the negative effects on society due 
to problems associated with individual investors in Shanghai differ 
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markedly from those in Taiwan (i.e., direct intervention into the mar-
ket as opposed to education and notification), the underlying rationale 
for acting is similar.
Also similar is the sense that international investors may provide 
solutions to such problems. A market official of the SSE explained that 
the government may have added foreign investment to its toolkit to 
control the market:
The government attitude to foreign institutional investment is quite 
practical. They want to use it as a way to control the flow of funds into 
the stock market. When the domestic investors have a very bad view of 
the China stock market, they will encourage foreign investors to come to 
China by enlarging the trading in the [QFII] quota. But when the domes-
tic market is bullish, they will impose stricter restrictions on foreign 
capital.
Despite the seemingly short-term perception of the usefulness of inter-
national investors, the regulators also value the potential of these inves-
tors to serve as a longer-term solution to the problems associated with 
domestic individual investors. The market official explained:
International investors are important because they bring capital to the 
market and they trade more with the international practices of trad-
ing…
Q. What do you mean ‘the international practices of trading’?
Value investment. China’s investment is very speculative due to the lack 
of institutional investors. It’s dominated by the retails. QFII is regarded 
as a class of institutional investors with sound risk management skills. 
They were encouraged as part of the regulator’s initiatives to encourage 
the growth of institutional investors… . The portfolio investment, the 
investment philosophy from the mature securities markets sort of help 
to spread the knowledge…There is a lot of discussion about the QFIIs’ 
shareholdings, their style of selection of stocks. It all helps to educate. 
[pause] But I’m not saying that they were superior to the Chinese. It’s 
sort of an interaction between the domestic investors and the QFIIs. 
There was learning from it.
As with Taiwan, international investors in Shanghai are a means to 
develop a greater influence of institutional investors to offset—and 
redirect—the speculation of domestic investors. In Taiwan the hope is 
that individuals would move toward managed funds, while in Shang-
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hai the design also includes individuals “learning” the foreign inves-
tors’ approaches to investing. While the precise nature of the change 
differs, in both cases foreign investors are seen as a means to transform 
the market by introducing new orientations toward the market.12
In both instances, international investors are seen in instrumental 
terms—as a means to increase institutional investing to control prob-
lematic market behavior. The hope underlying this orientation is that 
more “proper” market behavior will allow the exchanges to focus more 
successfully on raising capital, as the markets are more predictable and 
transparent to investors.
III. Fear: Political Orientations toward Foreign Investors
Despite the hope expressed in the instrumental orientation toward 
international investors, both exchanges reflect some ambivalence 
toward such investment. This more cautious stance toward interna-
tional investment reflects the political concerns dominant in both China 
and Taiwan. These fears seem largely to reflect the concerns of political 
leaders as distilled by the exchanges. Further, on balance, the actions of 
market regulators and the governments suggest that these fears do not 
drive policy, but remain as a source of caution in moving forward with 
policy reforms.
For mainland China, foreign investors pose the threat of gaining 
control over the national economy. As China’s economy moves increas-
ingly toward capitalism, the concern has been that the size of interna-
tional capital could overwhelm domestic capital in an uncontrollable 
fashion. As a market official noted:
The perception that the Chinese regulators had in the beginning of the 
stock market was that they [international investors] had huge capital 
and that they can easily manipulate the young Chinese market. That’s 
the perception—even now, they are still a little bit worried about the 
impact of the foreign investors.
The enduring nature of the concern about the impact of international 
capital on the domestic market reflects the worry that such capital is 
less subject to the control of the state, perhaps a bit ironic given the 
instrumental orientation toward this capital when it comes to helping 
to control domestic investors. This lack of control over foreign capital 
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also reflects concern about the modus operandi of international inves-
tors, as a market participant related:
I think it is safe to say that all Chinese regulators…believe that interna-
tional capital is going to come in and ramp up their market and all sell 
on the same day and crash it, even though what that means is that they 
all lost money. People aren’t that coordinated and, even if you were coor-
dinated, you couldn’t divide up the game fairly enough to make it work. 
But that’s the secret fear of every Chinese regulator that I’ve listened to. 
That white guys are going to come in and introduce dislocations into our 
economy through our capital markets.
Despite the variety of motives and interpretation of opportunities of 
international investors, they are seen as operating out of similar, coor-
dinated motives. The state, from this perspective, remains an important 
force to protect domestic investors from the threat posed by interna-
tional investors.
Despite its moves to liberalize rules governing foreign investment, 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange maintains one strict regulation: inward for-
eign investment from mainland China is prohibited. Part of the process 
of registering as a foreign investor involves declaring that the money 
that one is investing is not from mainland China. The rationale under-
lying this regulation is demonstrated by a conversation I had with two 
exchange officials (identified as “A” and “B”):
Q. Why is it important to…
A. Watch the money from mainland China?
Q. Yes.
A. Because they will disturb our economy.
B. This is the consideration for national security.
A. Yeah, they may not directly violate Taiwan…
B. They cannot invade by the army, but they can invade with capital.
A. They can use the economy to invade Taiwan. Say that they invest 
huge [sums of] money and manipulate [the market]. Then they sold a lot 
of securities and our stock market just gets destroyed and they withdraw 
all the money back…They would destroy our stock market and influence 
our currency. We just watched the experience from Hong Kong, when 
hedge funds participated in the Hong Kong market; they also influenced 
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the currency and stock markets. That’s what we worry about. Mainland 
China, we don’t know if their attitude is positive or negative. Sometimes 
they are the enemy of us.
While the government policy that established the restriction is based 
on the premise that China poses an economic threat to Taiwan, the 
development of the conversation suggests that these fears are shared 
by the stock exchange officials (if not on an official basis, at least on a 
personal level). Particularly striking is that the officials saw the experi-
ence of Hong Kong during the 1997 Asian economic crisis in terms of 
China, rather than in terms of global capital managers with a shorter-
term orientation, since the latter were widely perceived as precipita-
tors of the crisis.
While the source of the threats varies between the two exchanges—
international investors in Shanghai, Chinese investors in Taiwan—the 
nature of the threat is remarkably similar. In both exchanges, officials 
related concerns of regulators or the government that some external 
entity might gain control over the economy with the purpose of crash-
ing the market to induce economic harm. The difference in the source 
of the threats reflects differences in how the two governments relate to 
international politics. China, tainted by its non-democratic governance 
and human rights record, sees the world as potentially hostile. Taiwan, 
living under the threat of forceful unification with the mainland, expe-
riences international relations as part of a reflection of the cross-Strait 
dynamics.
IV. Dreams: Envisioning the Future of the Exchanges in the 
Region and the World
As organizations, both the Shanghai and Taiwan Stock Exchanges are 
guided by their visions for the future. These visions incorporate a rela-
tionship to global financial markets and a particular position within the 
region that is defined, to some extent, by the relation of the exchanges 
to other markets. These visions provide insight into how the exchanges 
might attempt to use economic means to achieve goals that are, at least 
presently, politically unfeasible.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange seeks minimally to develop into the 
leading capital market for East Asia, as related by a market observer:
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Shanghai—the articulated goal is to be a global financial center, or cer-
tainly a center for regional fundraising, so that Malaysian companies 
would come to Shanghai to list in the same way that other companies 
now go to Hong Kong to list.
This development includes the idea of integrating Hong Kong by list-
ing Chinese-based, Hong Kong-listed companies on the SSE. A market 
official explained:
China wants to build strongly the Shanghai Stock Market rather than 
just rely on the Hong Kong market for foreign capital from institutional 
investors…The goal is to have those big Chinese companies return to 
Shanghai. We think that the Shanghai stock market should be the main 
board of China, should represent China’s economy. It should be the lead-
ing stock exchange in China.
China sees the development of the exchange as a means to reclaim con-
trol over the public representation of the national economy. To realize 
this vision, however, there are two main problems: lack of the rule of 
law and government domination of the market. Both problems relate 
to the continuing influence of the Communist Party over develop-
ments in the country.
The Taiwan Stock Exchange sees its future as connected with inter-
national investors. One market official noted, “We would like to be rec-
ognized as an advanced [developed] market…If we can upgrade our 
status to a developed market, the funds invested would be larger.” The 
acknowledgement of advanced status serves as a means of attracting 
increased international capital, an important political and economic 
goal:
Internationalization is important because we are an island… . We like 
the global investors participating in our market, because as an island, 
you can not survive in isolation… . If more foreigners participate in the 
market or this country, I think it will improve our economy.
Beyond the economic effects, increased international investment has 
an important consequence: creating an international recognition of Tai-
wan as independent in a politically unfeasible manner. The institu-
tions that effectively keep Taiwan formally a non-state member of the 
international community do not operate in so strict a fashion in the 
economic realm.13 Attracting increased international investment builds 
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interest in maintaining the status quo in Taiwan—a stalemate in which 
a de facto independent Taiwan does not assert de jure independence in a 
manner that might cause Chinese aggression.
The cross-Strait relation plays out in fascinating ways with the two 
stock exchanges. In addition to limitations on Chinese investment in 
Taiwan, Taiwanese government policy restricts the amount of money 
Taiwanese companies can invest in the mainland. As a consequence, 
Taiwanese-listed companies are not permitted to invest more than 40% 
of shareholders’ equity in the mainland. When clarifying the policy 
with two TSE officials whose responsibilities include monitoring the 
activities of listed companies, the officials simultaneously answered 
my question of whether restrictions apply to overseas investment in 
other countries with the answer that it only applied to mainland China, 
stating, “that’s only a political issue.” Unlike the concern with the 
potential threat of Chinese investment in Taiwan, the officials in this 
instance consider the policy as detrimental, as it provides an incentive 
for companies from Taiwan to domicile in Hong Kong or another juris-
diction to get around the government’s restriction on their overseas 
investment activities.
In Shanghai, I tried to downplay my research in Taipei (which pre-
ceded my research in Shanghai) out of concern that mention of one of 
the “three Ts” (Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen) might compromise the 
integrity of the interview. In one interview with an official from the 
SSE, when I was directly asked about my findings, I became involved 
in a conversation about Taiwan. The official explained that the SSE 
thought it was important to learn from the experiences of Taiwan. 
When I expressed surprise, given the nature of intergovernmental rela-
tions, the official explained:
In the financial market, we learned a lot from Taiwan’s experience. It’s 
not political. It’s purely for the market…We attach a great importance 
to the experiences of Taiwan and Japan because we think they have a 
very similar background to the Chinese market. They are very highly 
regarded by the regulators.
The distinction between policy in Taiwan being “only a political issue” 
and policy in China being “not political” but “purely for the market” 
suggests that both exchanges have room for maneuver, but that some 
issues are decided by the governments.
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V. Conclusions
The comparative analysis of the international positioning of the Shang-
hai and Taiwan Stock Exchanges highlights a number of important 
similarities in international orientations, albeit for differing underlying 
motives. Both exchanges combine an instrumental view of interna-
tional investors as a means to control domestic individual investors, 
but still harbor doubts about opening up the market, as doing so may 
leave the economy unprotected from external threats. Additionally, 
harnessing international investment is viewed as an important step for 
each exchange in order to fulfill their visions for the future in the world 
and region. The motives behind these international orientations, how-
ever, reflect the partially subordinate position of the exchanges to the 
political positions of their national governments.
Returning to the opening question: Are these exchanges worlds apart 
or a part of a similar world? The exchanges have a surface similarity 
but appear to be distinguished by differences in their governments’ 
international concerns. My earlier research found that the position of 
stock exchanges in relation to the state is an important determinant 
of the operation and structure of markets.14 From this perspective, the 
question becomes whether the nature of the Chinese and Taiwanese 
states are markedly different. While there are clearly differences in 
the two governments’ approaches to democratic elections and free-
doms,15 the political economies of the two states may not be as distinct 
as casual observation suggests. Maurice Meisner’s article argues that 
Communist rule in China served the functional effect of laying the 
foundation for Chinese capitalism by transforming social relations, 
leveling the power of traditional landlords, and freeing the population 
to pursue economic activity.16 From another perspective, anthropolo-
gist Hill Gates argues that both countries share characteristics of tribu-
tary states.17 The political-economic organization of a tributary state 
features a class of state officials who extract sizable surpluses from the 
productive classes, establishing an important class relation between 
the state and the populace, and leaving capitalist classes underdevel-
oped.
While these two accounts conflict with each other—Gates’ sugges-
tion that the tributary state limits the growth of all but petty capitalists 
is at odds with Meisner’s account of the transformative nature of capi-
talism—both theories point to the nature of state-society relations in 
China and Taiwan. On one hand, the elements of the state attempting 
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to control individual investors in both countries, along with the rela-
tive lack of domestic institutions, seems to fit the model of the tribu-
tary state developed by Gates. If this interpretation is accurate, then it 
poses further questions about how societies organized around such a 
logic link with a global polity that focuses on nation-states organized 
around liberal individualist citizenship. On the other hand, the value 
placed on international investors as sources of socialization for domes-
tic investors and the hope of increasing the influence of institutions 
operating by international standards suggest a vision of societal trans-
formation along lines that are more similar to the global model. The 
direction of the development of state-society relations and the political 
economies in this region remain open questions. The answer depends 
on whether China and Taiwan will be driven more by their hopes or 
by their fears, determining if they see themselves as a part of or apart 
from the global political economy. •
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14. Larson 2004. In this research, I also found that speculation did not derive from 
individuals. Indeed, in two of the exchanges, officials bemoaned how individuals did 
not speculate but would frame their stock certificates as mementos, and in the third 
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exchange speculative trading was undertaken by specialized traders at the largest bro-
kerage firms.
15. While its repressions never reached the same level as those of the Chinese govern-
ment, it is important to recall that Taiwan was under martial law for four decades, until 
1987.
16. Meisner 2006.
17. Gates 1997. I was introduced to Gates’ work by Ellen Hertz’s book (1998).
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